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The study of criminal procedure in the United States has
long been quite insular. We seem to assume that we have the
best system of justice, and it rarely occurs to scholars or judges
even to wonder what other countries are doing. Many criminal
procedure issues provoke heated discussion in this country. We
argue about whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
is a good idea' or whether the Terry v. OhiJ stop and frisk doc-
trine is good policy. We worry about whether indigent defen-
dants receive effective assistance of counsel and, as one
consequence, whether innocent defendants are convicted.3 We
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A vORLDWIDE STuDY (Craig M. Bradley ed., Durham:
Carolina Academic Press 1999) [hereinafter BRADLEY].
Professor of Law &Judge P. Waugh, Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers Univer-
sity, Newark.
'See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment Frst Prinaples, 107 HAR%. L RE%'. 757
(1994); Donald A. Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionay, Rule, 38 AMm. CRlM.
L. REV. 1 (2001); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Prinaples, 107 HARv. L
REv. 820 (1994); George C. Thomas Im.iJudges Are Not Economists and Other Reasons To
Be Skeptical of Contingent Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Dripps 38 AMER. CM1s.
L. REV. 47 (2001).
2 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For more on the Terry doctrine, pro and con, see Terry v.
Ohio 30 Years Later. A Symposium on the Fourth Amendment, Law Enforcement, and Police-
Citizen Encounters, 72 ST.JoHN's L REv. 721 (1998).
" See, e.g., Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counse" Old Roads, New
Paths-A Dead End 2, 86 COLUM. L REV. 9, 115 (1986) (noting that "the Court's visions
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argue about victims' rights4 and about the Miranda v. Arizona'
approach to regulating police interrogation." But what is nota-
bly missing from the debate, in most cases, is an understanding
of the approach of other countries to these problems.
There are notable exceptions, of course-the path-breaking
work of John Langbein, Mirjan Damaska, Abraham Goldstein,
Martin Marcus, and Lloyd Weinreb7 provided a solid beginning
for a corpus of comparative law in the criminal procedure con-
text. Subsequent scholars have, for the most part, failed to
build on this solid base. Moreover, my completely unscientific
sampling discloses that the Warren Court was more likely to use
the law in other countries to justify its criminal procedure deci-
sions than is the Rehnquist Court. For a sample of one, con-
sider Miranda's reliance on interrogation law in Scotland,
Ceylon, England, and India to help justify its requirement of
warnings and waiver.8 Rather than question the wisdom or util-
ity of using the law from other countries to shape American law,
Justice Harlan's dissent took issue with the Court's understand-
ing of the laws of these countries.9 By engaging the substantive
of the right to counsel and the role of counsel are incoherent, or downright cynical");
Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Stan-
dard, 88J. C~aM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (agreeing that current doctrine is
dysfunctional); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendmen4 78 IOwA L. REv. 433 (1993) (concluding that, in death penalty cases, the
Court has indulged in the "lethal fiction" that lawyers are universally competent to
represent criminal defendants).
' Compare Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims'
Rights Amendment 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, with Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and
the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO.
LJ. 1691 (1997).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 For recent commentary on Miranda, see Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson:
The Future of Confession Law, 99 MICH. L. REv. 879 (2001). See also Paul G. Cassell, The
Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overruling ofMiranda, 85 IoWA L. REv.
175 (1999); Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interroga-
tors' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REv. 397, 414
(1999); George C. Thomas HI, The End of the RoadforMiranda v. Arizona?: On the His-
tory and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AMER. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (2000).7 SeeJOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977);JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE
(1974); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiay Barriers to Convictions and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PENN. L. REv. 506 (1973); Abraham Goldstein &
Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France,
Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 Yale LJ. 1549 (1977).
384 U.S. at 486-91.
Id. at 521-22 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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law on which the majority relied, Harlan's dissent suggests
broad agreement that comparative law is a useful tool.
But when time came, thirty-four years later, to reaffirm
Miranda, not a single Justice on the Rehnquist Court mentioned
the experience in other countries during the Miranda era.' o
Bradley's book makes clear that other countries (including Rus-
sia!) have developed similar rules about interrogation. A recent
paper by Stephen Thaman concludes that much of Europe now
provides broader protection for the suspect during police inter-
rogation than does the United States.' Given the Rehnquist
Court's view that "Miranda has become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture,"'2 it would have strengthened the
argument to show that other countries had discovered the utility
of similar rules. The experience in other countries is at least
relevant. But the Court was silent on how the rest of the world
regulated interrogation.
Bradley's book is thus a welcome antidote to the recent in-
sularity of the criminal procedure debate. The essays on the law
of criminal procedure in twelve countries provide welcome de-
tail, not only as to the formal law but often to law as it is prac-
ticed in the various countries. Professor Bradley explains the
omission of Egypt, Japan, Poland, and Australia,'" and I won-
dered about the absence of Turkey and Greece. Are there in-
fluences from the Ottoman Empire and ancient Greece that
make their modem law different from that in Europe? But it is
difficult to argue with Spain, Italy, France, and Germany from
the European continent, with England as the "mother" of the
common law, with Canada from North America (along with the
United States, of course), and with South Africa, China, Russia,
and Israel as more exotic systems. The only choice that seemed
a bit peculiar was Argentina. Why not Brazil? Or Mexico? Or
all three? Mexico's experience, as our southern neighbor, must
be quite different from that of Argentina, both of which might
be different from Brazil, a former colony of Portugal. To pick a
" Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
" Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L J. 581
(2001).
1 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted).
" BRADLEY, supra note *, at xxiv.
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single country from all of Latin and South America struck me as
a little too focused on the Northern Hemisphere.
No selection could satisfy everyone, of course, and Bradley's
book is a gold mine of perspectives. Imagine in one book a
chance to compare France with Germany, the United States
with Argentina, Spain with Italy and Argentina, England with
Canada. The wealth of detail that is the virtue of the book
forces the reviewer to make difficult choices about what to dis-
cuss. My methodology is to begin with a few comments on the
book as a whole. The bulk of the essay then focuses on three
areas of criminal procedure. First, when can the police detain
and question a citizen on the street? Second, what is the stan-
dard for providing lawyers for indigent defendants and what at-
tention is given to the question of whether counsel is effective?
Third, how are criminal verdicts reviewed and can the prosecu-
tion appeal an acquittal? I seek by this selection to cover the
criminal process from the earliest point at which the police typi-
cally come into contact with the suspect, to the use of defense
lawyers to test the prosecution's case, to the appellate review of
the criminal verdict.
Each of these aspects of the criminal process can tell us
much about the values of the architects of the system. The rules
governing the initial police intervention are a compromise be-
tween strong countervailing policies-permitting police to in-
tervene early to stop or solve crime balanced against a genuine
concern that unbounded discretion trenches too harshly on in-
dividual liberty. The right to counsel issue is important because
how a system dispenses counsel to indigent defendants, and the
standard of performance to which counsel are held, tells us
much about the process-oriented values that the policy makers
hold. The review of verdicts and whether the prosecution can
appeal tells us how systems detect and correct errors and how
the risk of error is allocated; here I think we can learn from the
rest of the world.
I will conclude on the issue of police detaining suspects that
the United States has moved closer to the rest of the world.
Though the rules governing police-citizen contacts on the street
are superficially different here than in most other countries, the
United States Supreme Court has created sufficient flexibility
that American police have almost as much discretion in practice
to detain briefly and question those suspected of criminal activ-
ity as police in other countries. Just as the rest of the world set
794 [Vol, 91
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the model for police-citizen encounters, we are setting the
model for appointed counsel. Having effective appointed coun-
sel is not as important in the other countries surveyed in Brad-
ley's book as it is in the United States, but the world is moving
closer to our model on this issue.
The greatest disparity between the United States and the
other countries is the structure of the appellate process. In this
country, the appellate courts in criminal cases are largely lim-
ited to affirming the underlying conviction or reversing and
remanding for a new trial. Canada seems to follow that model
as well. But in all the other countries, to a greater or lesser de-
gree, the appellate courts rehear the case. By virtue of this
broader review, the appellate court can modify a conviction to
correct any errors and can change an acquittal to a conviction,
all without remanding for a new trial. While far from costless, a
prosecution appeal of an acquittal in this kind of system does
not deplete a defendant's resources or prolong his anxiety to
the same extent as if a second trial might follow the state's ap-
peal. On this issue, we are almost alone in the world in insisting
that an egregiously wrong acquittal cannot be appealed.
These three issues are, of course, a radically incomplete
sample of the dozens of issues that would benefit from a com-
parative law discussion. But they provide a flavor of Bradley's
book as well as a window into the way the world's criminal pro-
cedure may be moving toward a form of "globalization," as a
recent book also suggests.
I. AN OvERvIEw
Bradley's methodology facilitates comparisons among the
countries. He asked the authors of the individual chapters to
utilize an outline of criminal procedure based on the United
States model, thus "forcing" other systems into our model.
While this can produce awkward comparisons, and can obscure
genuine differences that might otherwise emerge, I think it on
balance beneficial. It highlights the often striking similarity in
the approaches of the various countries to criminal procedure
issues. At least in most areas, the sameness of the human expe-
rience overcomes any historic or formal distinctions, and we are
all much more the same than we are different.
"4 CHRISTOPH SAFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(2001).
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Take police stops of vehicles as one example. Police natu-
rally have an incentive to stop vehicles that are operating un-
safely or that appear suspicious. What are the appropriate limits
on when police can stop vehicles to determine whether there
are grounds to issue a ticket or to arrest the occupants? One
might adopt a rule, as has the United States, that vehicle stops
implicate important constitutional rights and then create a se-
ries of exceptions that allow police to stop almost any car they
want to stop. In the United States, police can stop a vehicle that
is violating any of dozens of traffic laws'5 and often discover evi-
dence of a more serious crime in plain view; police can set up
roadblocks to check for drunken drivers;' 6 and police can stop
any car if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the
driver is committing or has committed a crime." If a police of-
ficer cannot find a legitimate basis to stop a car in that catalog
of exceptions, he is not very creative.
In Argentina, by comparison, the relevant constitutional
provision protects only dwellings, personal correspondence, and
private documents.18 Police can thus stop any vehicle they wish
because vehicles are not protected against arbitrary stops.' 9 In
the United States, vehicles in theory are protected against arbi-
trary stops but police can stop (just about) any vehicle they wish
because the Supreme Court has decided that vehicles deserve
less protection than homes and private papers. What Argentina
does openly by the way it articulates the relevant protection, the
United States does indirectly by creating exceptions to the rele-
vant protection. But we wind up pretty much in the same place.
A police officer transported from Argentina to the United States
would operate just the same though he would have to learn a
new vocabulary to achieve the vehicle stops that he wanted.
The differences in the law of interrogation are too subtle to
be adequately explored in one part of a short essay-I recom-
mend Stephen Thaman's new paper 2 -- but it is worth notin'g
" Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Whren thus permits police to en-
gage in racial profiling. For more on racial profiling, see Symposium, 3 RuTGERS
RACE& L. REV. 1 (2001).
26 Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
17 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
'6 Alejandro P. Carrio & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in BRADLEY, supra note *,
at 9.
Id. at 8.
Thaman, supra note 11.
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that the country that gave us the voluntariness test has now re-
jected it in favor of a strict test of reliability. In England, a con-
fession "is admissible only if the accused accepts, or the
prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt, that it was not ob-
tained by oppression or in consequence of anything said or
done which was likely to render the confession unreliable."2 1 I
suspect that this standard would result in suppression of more
confessions than the Miranda prophylactic rule that is designed
to protect the suspect's right to remain silent.Y
Moreover, Italy seems to have outdone the United States in
terms of rules protecting the individual's right to remain silent.
If the police are examining someone not yet a suspect, and he
makes an incriminating statement, the police are required "to
interrupt the individual and warn him that investigations may
begin against him, and that he has a right to name a defense at-
torney." Statements made prior to that time are inadmissible
against the speaker. Once an individual becomes a suspect, he
may be questioned as to identity, but police must warn the sus-
pect of "his right to remain silent" as to other matters, must
prepare a transcript of the questioning, must invite the suspect
to name defense counsel or have defense counsel appointed,
must notify the counsel of any scheduled questioning, and must
not proceed unless counsel is present. 4 According to Rachel
VanCleave, nothing indicates "that a suspect may waive the right
to have counsel present."2' Moreover, statements taken in the
absence of counsel "may not be used at trial except for purposes
of impeachment."2 6 This compendium of rules makes Miranda's
protections appear quite spare by comparison. Thaman agrees
that Italy's protection is broader than Miranda "7 And it is wor-
thy of note that Russian courts have interpreted the Russian
2 DavidJ. Feldman, England and Wales, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 113.
For recent commentary on Miranda, see supra note 6.
Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in BRADL=Y, supra note *, at 263.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 264. This paragraph oversimplifies VanCleave's discussion. The state-
ment about suspects applies only to suspects who are not under arrest. The interro-
gation of suspects who are under arrest is governed by other rules, which depend on
when the case is turned over to the prosecutor and the scheduling of a preliminary
investigation by ajudge. Id. at 265-66. When the case is turned over to the prosecu-
tor, "police questioning may occur only upon delegation of this power to the police
by the prosecutor." Id. at 265.
Id. at 264.
2Thaman, supra note 11, at 618.
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Federation Constitution to require, prior to interrogation, a
warning of the right against self-incrimination; the sanction for
not providing the warnings is the suppression of the state-
ments. 
28
Bradley's book is filled with delicious discoveries in all areas
of the law of criminal procedure. One of the many values of the
book is that the chapters are heavily, almost obsessively, foot-
noted. A reader who wants to know more about the Argentine
protection of dwellings, correspondence, and private docu-
ments, for example, has an easy trail to the original materials. 29
A reader curious about the source of the exclusionary rule in
Argentina has not only a cite to the relevant case but also, for
context, a summary of the political events (harsh military rule)
that preceded the case.3"
Just to mention a few other gems: In South Africa, the At-
torney General can authorize the arrest and detention of wit-
nesses for interrogation in the interests of the administration of
justice, 3' but a confession can be excluded if the police make a
threat or a promise during interrogation, 2 an odd combination
of expansive authority to question limited by concern about the
effect of that questioning. The law of the Russian Federation
regulates the use of undercover informants while the law of the
United States does not.33 The Russian Constitution specifically
provides, in two places, that "illegally obtained evidence is in-
admissible in court,"' while our Bill of Rights is maddeningly si-
lent on this issue. Italy has an anti-racketeering law that seems,
at least in part, modeled on the United States Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act.3 China has adopted the
legality principle and the presumption of innocence.3 6
Sometimes the simplest observation can suggest profound
differences in the mind set and methodology of different judi-
28 Catherine Newcombe, Russian Federation, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 298-99.
9Carrio & Garro, supra note 18, at 9-17.
Id. at 17-23.
PamelaJ. Schwikkard & Stephen E. van der Merwe, South Africa, in BRADLEY, su-
pra note *, at 329.
12 Id. at 339.
" Compare Newcombe, supra note 28, at 293, with United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971).
'4 Newcombe, supra note 28, at 295.
32 CompareVanCleave, supra note 23, at 256, with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
LilingYue, China, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 86.
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cial systems. Alejandro Carrio and Alejandro Garro report that
the "Argentine legal system does not recognize the doctrine of
stare decisis" but that "the rules and practices followed in the
criminal process are shaped, to a certain extent, by interpretive
standards issued from time to time by state and federal courts."37
I immediately wanted to know more about a system that explic-
itly rejects stare decisis but relies on "interpretive standards" is-
sued by courts. I suspect, in practice, it is little different from
our system that embraces stare decisis but with a tradition of
judges seeking just results through "creative" use of the facts
and precedents. To understand fully how the two systems treat
interpretive precedents would be worth an article, if not a book,
in itself.
Even my remarks on the three areas of focus for this essay
will necessarily oversimplify. But I offer the reader an overview,
based on the Bradley collection of essays, of how different legal
systems deal with three problems in the administration of jus-
tice-police stops of citizens on the street, providing counsel to
indigent defendants, and the appellate review of trial verdicts.
II. POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS
Police-citizen encounters in the United States are largely
regulated by what American criminal procedure scholars refer
to as the Teny doctrine, a collection of doctrines and sub-
doctrines that began with the Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio."
Much is packed into the deceptively simple phrase "Terry doc-
trine." St. John's University Law School in 1998 hosted a two-
day symposium exploring the history, doctrinal permutations,
and future of the Terry doctrine.s9 For my purposes in this es-
say, I focus on only one aspect of the doctrine-what must the
police show to permit them to detain a person temporarily on
the street and ask questions about his activities?
In Terry, the veteran police officer observed Terry and his
companion make roughly a dozen trips back and forth past a
store window, over perhaps fifteen minutes, often conferring
with each other on a street comer, and sometimes conferring
with a third man. The police officer suspected the men of "cas-
'7 Carrio & Garro, supra note 18, at 4.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
' Terry v. Ohio 30 Years Later, supra note 2.
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ing a job, a stick-up" and feared that they had a gun. He ap-
proached the three men in front of another store. The officer
identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names.
The men "'mumbled something' in response," at which point
the officer grabbed Terry and patted down the outside of his
clothing. He felt and seized a revolver from Terry's overcoat
pocket. The United States Supreme Court said that while the
officer lacked probable cause to arrest Terry of a crime, he did
have reasonable suspicion to suspect that criminal activity might
be about to occur. The Court held that this reasonable suspi-
cion gave the officer grounds under the Fourth Amendment to
seize the suspects and frisk them for weapons.
4
3
One aspect of Terry often escapes notice, at least until one
reads Justice Harlan's concurring opinion." The "stop" of Terry
coincided with the frisk. There was no antecedent seizure of
Terry because the act of a police officer approaching someone
on the street is not itself a seizure. The police have a right, in
common with everyone else "to address questions to other per-
sons [and] ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to
ignore his interrogator and walk away." 45 Thus, the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated until the officer physically
seized Terry and frisked him. Had Terry made an incriminating
statement, for example, prior to the officer grabbing him, it
would have been admissible even if the officer lacked reason-
able suspicion to seize Terry. Thus, when we ask whether the
police can stop someone on the street, we need to distinguish
between approaching and asking questions, which requires no
justification under Terry, and having the authority to detain the
person if he tries to leave, which requires particularized suspi-
cion.
Moreover, what is required to justify a Teny detention
should be distinguished from what is required to justify an ar-
rest. Reasonable suspicion likely requires a lower probability
than probable cause, though the Court has never achieved
much precision with either standard. A clear distinction be-
40 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
41 Id. at 7.
4
1
2 1 at 15-16 & 28.
I& at 28- 30.
41 Id at 31-34 (Harlan,J., concurring).
4 Id. at 32-33 (Harlan,J., concurring).
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tween the two standards, however, is that a Terry detention can
be based on suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot"4
6
without the officer having to specify what crime he suspects. An
arrest, on the other hand, is the beginning of the criminal pro-
cess against someone. A charging document must be filed, and
it must contain the name of a particular crime. The most im-
portant way that Terry broadens police discretion, therefore,
may be in permitting them to make detentions based on a gen-
eralized suspicion of criminal activity.
Hans Lensing contends in his overview chapter ending the
book that "[mlost systems do not have something identical or
similar to" the United States rule about detentions on the
street.47 Identical, no. Similar, I think yes. Two basic ap-
proaches exist, though some countries utilize both. One ap-
proach, typified by Terry, is to require police to have a level of
individualized suspicion before they can detain and question a
suspect. The second approach, followed generally in the civil
law countries, is to permit police to detain anyone for purposes
of ascertaining identity. During that process, of course, police
can learn information that will lead to grounds for arrest and, in
some countries, can search the individual looking for evidence
of identification if the person fails to provide it. I begin with the
approaches that require individualized suspicion.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held in 1993 that there is a
common law right to detain a person as long as the officer has
"an objectively determined articulable cause or reasonable sus-
picion of a crime,"48 a standard that is identical in its articulation
to Terry's standard. The power to frisk also apparently requires
a Terry-like justification .4 If this accurately states the common
law in all the provinces, Canada has a rule indistinguishable
from Terry. In England, a police officer is permitted to stop and
search if he has "reasonable grounds for suspecting that he will
find stolen or prohibited articles, or an article which has a blade
or is sharply pointed."0 Searches on "reasonable grounds" to
suspect are permitted for other specific items-including fire-
4 6
1 Id. at 30.
4 Hans Lensing, General Comments, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 426.
48 Kent W. Roach, Canada, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 55 (citing Simpson [1993)
79 C.C.C. 3d 482).
' Id. at 55 (citing Simpson, [1993] 79 G.C.C. 3d at 482, and noting that it relied
on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), when discussing the frisk issue).
5 Feldman, supra note 21, at 93.
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arms, controlled drugs, and smuggled or dutiable items.5' This
list is broader than the actual holding in Terry, which was limited
to detentions and frisks based on reasonable suspicion that the
person was "armed and presently dangerous,"5 but Terry has
been expanded to crimes that do not necessarily imply that the
person is armed and dangerous.53 So the scope of the British
rule seems very similar to ours.
One might be tempted to say, as did Thomas Weigend, that
"[t]here is no German counterpart to the American 'stop' as a
brief detention on the street."" But Weigend appropriately fol-
lows up this formalistic claim with a lengthy description of the
right of German police to "take the measures necessary for es-
tablishing the identity of persons suspected of having commit-
ted a criminal offense (or even a mere administrative
infraction). '' s He notes that "[siuspicion" has been "defined
very loosely in this context" to include even "insignificant and
uncertain indications" of "involvement in criminal activity. '
Moreover, German police "routinely frisk anyone whom they
believe to be armed in order to 'prevent commission of an of-
fense.' 57 German police do not have the Terry vocabulary, but
they have a right to detain and search that is virtually the same.
At least six other countries appear to follow a Terry-like
standard, though in each case it is unclear exactly how the
probability standard compares to "reasonable suspicion." In
Spain, police may frisk anyone "to identify and to arrest offend-
ers involved in crimes causing 'public alarm' and to recover in-
struments, proceeds or evidence relating to such crimes."58 This
seems similar to Terry, but Richard Vogler reports that "[n] o dis-
tinct level of individual suspicion is required" and gives as an
Id. at 93-94.
"392 U.S. at 30.
"The Court permits detentions in airports of individuals suspected of carrying
drugs. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980). Although the success of the hijackers on September 11, 2001,
disclosed that airports are not as free of weapons as we had been led to believe, the
Court in its airport cases does not mention the risk of the detained person being
"armed and presently dangerous," thus suggesting that this factor is no longer im-
portant in the Terry analysis.
" Thomas Weigend, Germany, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 189.
55 Id.
56Id.
' Id. at 190.
" Richard Vogler, Spain, in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 376.
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example of a legitimate frisk the search of anyone getting off a
bus that had come from an area known for drug dealing. 9 In
Argentina, if the police have "strong indications of guilt" and
there is "imminent danger of escape," a suspect can be detained
"for the sole purpose of carrying the suspect before the judge
who will decide on detention."6
If Israeli police have reasonable suspicion to believe some-
one has committed a crime they can demand his name and ad-
dress.6' Failure to provide that information is itself an arrestable
crime.62 In France, police can demand identification from any-
one "as to whom there is an indication that he ... is preparing
to commit a major felony [or misdemeanor]."o Someone who
is unable to furnish identity can be detained for up to four
hours.6 In China, the law permits detention, not called arrest,
without approval by prosecutor or judge, for three to seven days
if the suspect "is preparing to commit a crime, is in the process
of committing a crime, or is discovered immediately after com-
mitting a crime."6 It is unclear from the chapter what standard,
if any, police must have to believe that these grounds are met.
Another ground for lengthy detention is "strong suspicion that
he is a person who goes from place to place committing
crimes. "6
Another way of approaching the problem of suspicious per-
sons on the street is to permit police to question them or de-
mand identification without having to demonstrate any basis for
suspicion. In Italy, any public official, including police, can
demand identification of persons, and it is a misdemeanor to
refuse to provide the information.6 Spain also permits police
59 Id.
Carrio & Garro, supra note 18, at 7 n.20.
61 Eliaku Harnon & Alex Stein, Isra in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 219.
Id. at 220 (noting that the crime of which the person is suspected must be an
arrestable crime before the failure to provide name and address can give grounds to
arrest).
Richard S. Frase, France in BRADLEY, supra note *, at 151.
6, Id at 152. At least one state in this country, Texas, has created the offense of re-
fusing to provide a correct name and address to a "peace officer who has lawfully
stopped him and requested the information." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 n.1
(1979) (citing TEX. PENALCoDEANN. § 38.02(a) (1974)).
65Yue, supra note 36, at 82.
0' Id. at 83. There are five additional "categories of circumstances under which
detention may be effected." Id. at 82-83.
6VanCleave, supra note 23, at 247.
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to demand proof of identity of any person.6 Those who fail to
establish their identity can be taken to the police station. One
ground for lengthy detention in China is when the suspect
"does not reveal his true name and address or if his identity is
unclear."
Countries can, of course, combine this approach with the
individualized suspicion approach of Teny. In Argentina, po-
lice can stop a person in a public place and put "a few questions
to him or her" without "any level of suspicion."9 Police can de-
tain for up to ten hours anyone who does not establish his iden-
tity if they have "well-grounded reasons to presume that a
person ha committed or may commit a criminal offense or mi-
nor infraction and such person fails to establish her personal
identity." 
70
Under the Russian Administrative Offenses Code, "a person
may be detained by law enforcement authorities for up to three
hours for, among other things, the purpose of establishing iden-
tity or preventing administrative offenses.' Once the stop is
made, the official "may conduct a protective frisk for weapons, a
check on outstanding warrants, and/or a personal search."72
Catherine Newcombe reports that, in practice, "sufficient
grounds" are required to make the stop even though no stan-
dard is set out in the Code.73 If "sufficient grounds" requires in-
dividualized suspicion, the Russian approach also seems quite
similar to Terry.
What this brief excursion into the worldwide law of detain
and frisk has revealed, I believe, is that citizens of most coun-
tries want the police to make early interventions to prevent
crime or arrest criminals as soon as possible but, at the same
time, are fearful of too much police discretion. So even in Rus-
sia, a country without a long tradition of respecting individual
rights, a practice has apparently grown up that limits the blan-
ket discretion the Administrative Offenses Code seems to give
officials to detain anyone for up to three hours. No similar evo-
lution appears in the law of China. Precisely how the line be-
' Vogler, supra note 55, at 375.
61 Carrio & Garro, supra note 18, at 7.
70 Id. at 7-8.





tween "good" discretion and "bad" discretion is drawn seems to
vary a little among the countries, but only a little. Countries
that draw their traditions from England seem a little more skep-
tical of giving police broad discretion to detain people. Coun-
tries that have a history of problems with terrorists (Italy, Israel)
seem to favor broader discretion. Countries committed to a
civil law model with a, hopefully, benevolent government
(France, Germany, Spain) also seem comfortable with broader
discretion in officials to detain for a variety of reasons. Most of
the countries permit detentions that last for hours, or longer,
and include being taken to the police station. This is a broader
limitation on liberty than Terry permits. Though there is no
mechanical time limit on a Terry detention, the Court has in-
validated detentions as short as half an hour74 and has insisted
that the police have no authority under Terry to take the suspect
to the police station.
But the overarching point to draw from this study is that the
police in every country could have detained Terry and, proba-
bly, frisked him in the manner that the Cleveland police did, an
exercise of police discretion that the United States Supreme
Court upheld by a vote of eight to one. Chief Justice Earl War-
ren, the author of Miranda v. Arizona, wrote the Terry opinion
that was also joined by liberal Justices Brennan and Marshall. It
seems that, on the issue of giving police discretion to stop or
solve crimes by briefly detaining suspects, the citizens of the
world pretty much agree that the police should not be restricted
too much. Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter in Terry, insisted
that the Fourth Amendment to our Constitution contained only
a single standard by which to judge whether the seizure of a
person is permissible "probable cause" and, therefore, the
Court should require that standard regardless of the nature or
duration of the detention. But that approach was too restrictive
for the other eight members of the Court and, so it seems, for
the citizens of much of the rest of the world.
On this issue, the United States has moved closer to the
other countries. Our historic fear of the central government di-
rectly led to the Bill of Rights and its high barriers against fed-
eral agents and prosecutors. During the debate on the Bill of
Rights, for example, Patrick Henry said that the right to trial by
7 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
' Dunaway v. NewYork, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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jury "prevents the hand of oppression from cutting you off.
They may call any thing rebellion, and deprive you of a fair trial
by an impartial jury of your neighbors.," He concluded, "[a] s
this government stands, I despise and abhor it."" That visceral
fear moderated during the nineteenth century and by today has
largely been displaced by a fear of organized crime, drug traf-
fickers, violent criminals, and terrorists. I doubt that Tery
would have been decided the same way by the 1807 Supreme
Court that ordered two of Aaron Burr's co-conspirators released
from pre-trial confinement.78 Despite the introduction into evi-
dence of a detailed letter implicating them in a conspiracy to
raise an army and march on Baton Rouge,7 Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote an opinion for the Court concluding that the
government did not have probable cause. The fear of the
strong central government pursuing its enemies is the only
plausible way to understand this holding. Today we are more
likely to be afraid of those who would conspire to overthrow our
government.
III. PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
Another important inflection point in the criminal process
is the decision of whether to provide a lawyer for an accused
who cannot afford one. The United States Supreme Court
managed to avoid laying down any hard and fast rule in this
country until 1963. Earlier cases left the matter largely in the
discretion of the trial judge, who was to consider whether the
failure to provide a lawyer amounted to a denial of "fundamen-
tal fairness" under the facts and circumstances of the individual
case. 0 In 1963, however, the Court unanimously held in Gideon
v. Wainwrighl that the state must provide counsel to indigent
defendants facing felony charges. Gideon asserted that a fair
trial could not be held if "the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him."82 Indeed, the
Court even engaged in a superficial bit of comparative law in
6 NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BI.L OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES,
AND ORIGINS 438 (1997).
"Id.
78 SeeExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
"See id. at 131-32.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).




Gideon, asserting that the "right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
trials in some countries, but it is in ours.""
The purpose of this part of the essay is to test the Court's as-
sumption that other countries might treat more lightly the indi-
gent's need for a lawyer. Under the more paternalistic umbrella
of the civil law, it was certainly a reasonable hypothesis that law-
yers might be viewed, in general, as less relevant to achieving a
fair and accurate result. What we will discover is that the more
extensive the role of the defense lawyer in testing the case-
questioning defense witnesses and cross-examining prosecution
witnesses-the more likely it is that counsel will only be pro-
vided when the stakes are high or when the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. The scope
of the role of defense counsel seems to be inversely related to
the breadth of the provision of free counsel. When one is nar-
row, the other tends to be broad.
The role of the lawyer in the United States is broader than
in any other country; lawyers are almost total alter egos who
function as the defendant in investigating the facts, bargaining
for a reduced charge or sentence, making motions, developing
a strategy, picking a jury, deciding what witnesses to call and
how to examine and cross-examine witnesses, arguing the case
to the jury, and deciding dozens of questions involving appeal.
Given this extreme breadth of function, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that the Supreme Court has limited Gideon's scope.
States may require proof of indigency and, so far, the Supreme
Court has not set any standards for that determination. If a
state assumed, for example, that a person with a job making
twice the minimum wage is not indigent, that test would not vio-
late any Supreme Court precedents but would likely exclude
many defendants who realistically could not afford a lawyer to
defend against a serious charge. Gideon also only applies if the
defendant is sentenced to a jail term.8 Thus, the judge can
deny the request for counsel even when the accused faces a year
in jail as long as the judge limits the penalties attending convic-
tion to a fine, license revocation, and other non-incarceration
sanctions.' In the United States, therefore, appointed counsel
&Id.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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enjoys an unlimited role and a broad, but not unlimited, cover-
age.
Argentina, by contrast, provides a broader right to counsel
but one that has a narrower function. Counsel is paid for by the
state without requiring proof of lack of resources: "The right to
be represented by a public defender is not subject to the defen-
dant's proof of lack of financial resources."8 Moreover, the
right to counsel in Argentina exists regardless of the petty na-
ture of the offense. 7 The description of the role of the lawyer at
the trial stage is sketchy, but it is not as extensive as in the
United States. Prior to the 1993 reforms, "criminal proceedings
at the federal level consisted of a succession of written motions
and intermittent interlocutory decisions."8 The lawyer's role
was presumably to prepare these documents and argue for par-
ticular outcomes in the interlocutory proceedings. The present
model provides for a "concentrated and oral trial conducted by
a panel of three judges." 9 But the "most relevant evidence is
likely to have been collected before the trial" 90when the magis-
trate controls the investigation.9' The magistrate begins the in-
vestigation by questioning the defendant: "Neither the
prosecutor or defense counsel is allowed to object to the ques-
tions posed by the magistrate, and they cannot pose questions to
the defendant without the judge's authorization .. ." Moreo-
ver, the trial court is permitted to request evidence at trial on its
own motion,9" and the prosecutor's actions at trial are "not
characterized by an adversarial zeal, but rather as those of a
neutral decision maker."94 The picture that emerges is of prose-
cution and defense lawyers who assist the judge in presenting
the evidence, a far less central role than lawyers play in this
country.






" Id. at 42.
9' Id. at 45.
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In France, defendants have a right to appointed counsel
when charged with any crime or misdemeanor," a broader rule
than in the United States,5 but Frase reports that the "trial is
primarily conducted by the presiding judge, and lawyers play
relatively passive roles."" If Camus's account in The Stranger is
accurate, it is a passive role indeed. The narrator describes his
lawyer as asking only a few questions. Most of the trial is con-
ducted by the prosecutor and judge. France, then, is another
example of a broad right to appointed counsel whose role is
somewhat peripheral.
Trials in Italy were similar to those in France until a 1989
code revision "create[d] a more active role for the defense at-
torney with the use of examination and cross-examination of
those giving statements to the court."s A 1990 Italian law "pro-
vides that the State will pay for the legal expenses of indigents
[charged with felonies] whether the counsel is selected by the
defendant or appointed by the court."9 This is broader than
under United States law, where the indigent defendant has no
right at all to select his own lawyer, not even from among the
public defenders who work in a particular office.'" The Italian
rule is narrower in that it is limited to felonies. An indigent de-
fendant in the United States cannot be incarcerated even for a
misdemeanor, even for one day, unless he has been represented
by counsel. Comparing Italy to France is useful. France has a
far broader coverage (any offense that permits imprisonment
versus only felonies) but a far narrower scope than Italy's right
to counsel. Once again, there seems to be a trade off between
scope of function and breadth of coverage.
The role of counsel in Germany seems close to the French
model, though Weigend makes no mention of a general right to
appointed counsel. Indeed, he speaks of the prosecutor taking
Frase, supra note 60, at 177 notes that defendants "have a right to appointed
counsel in both Assize and Correctional Court." Assize and Correctional Courts try
crimes and "delicts" (misdemeanors). See id. at 169 & 144. "Delicts are punishable
with a fine and/or a prison term" as well as lesser sanctions. Id.
"The United States rule requires counsel only when imprisonment is in fact im-
posed. SeeScottv. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
Frase, supra note 60, at 177.
' VanCleave, supra note 23, at 278.
"Id.
103 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 2 (1983) (overruling Court of Appeals deci-
sion that trial judge should have granted continuance to allow particular public de-
fender to appear in court for defendant).
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on the role of an advocate "[e]specially when the defendant is
represented by counsel,"10' implying that it is far from routine
that defendants have lawyers. As in France, the presiding judge
in Germany conducts the trial. He "determines the sequence in
which proof is taken, is responsible for the completeness of the
evidence, and interrogates the defendant, witnesses and expert
witnesses.' '0 2 Nonetheless, the defendant and the defense law-
yer "have the right to ask additional questions of witnesses" and
to "demand that the court take additional evidence."'0 3 The
breadth of the right of indigent defendants to counsel is un-
clear from Weigend's account but the role is somewhere be-
tween that in France and that in Italy and the United States.
At the other end of the spectrum are countries where law-
yers have long played a central, adversarial role designed to test
the state's case. Most of these countries seem to follow the pre-
Gideon rule about the breadth of coverage, that counsel is re-
quired only when a defendant cannot otherwise receive a fair
trial. In South Africa, for example, the trial is an adversarial
proceeding where the prosecution has to rebut the presump-
tion of innocence and prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'
But South Africa requires a lawyer to be "assigned" by the state
"at state expense" only "if substantial injustice would otherwise
result.',
0 5
England has an articulated test very much like the pre-1963
test in the United States. The judge must find appointment of
counsel "desirable ... in the interests ofjustice" by taking:
... account of the seriousness of the consequences which the accused
could face if convicted, the significance and complexity of any issues of
law, the difficulties which are likely to be faced in investigating the case
on his behalf, the ability of the defendant to represent himself, and the
risk that a witness might be seriously distressed if forced to be cross-
examined by the defendant in person.
In a few categories of cases, counsel must be provided , but
these seem likely to be quite limited in terms of the numbers of
"' Weigend, supra note 51, at 209.
" Id. (parentheticals giving citations omitted).
103 Id. (noting that the trial court can deny the motion to take additional evidence
if it "is obviously redundant or irrelevant").
,0' Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 31, at 349.
Id. at 353.
,o Feldman, supra note 21, at 125.
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defendants. 7 England is, of course, the mother of the common
law method and trials are fully adversarial, with the prosecution
required to establish all elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt.103
Despite being a civil law country, Spain seems to follow Eng-
land on this point. Spain has a state legal aid system that, ac-
cording to Richard Vogler, works "the same way as in the
U.K."' As we just saw, judges in the U.K. must find appoint-
ment of counsel "desirable ... in the interests of justice.""" If
this is also true in Spain, the system resembles the pre-1963 sys-
tem in the United States. Vogler does not describe the role of
defense lawyers in Spanish courts, though the lawyers that ap-
pear in court on behalf of defendants are called "advocates,"
which might suggest that they play more of an adversarial role
than in France. That is borne out by Vogler's description of the
role of prosecutors. Though prosecutors are formally charged
with ensuring that the rights of the suspect and victim are pro-
tected equally, they are increasingly "being required to adopt a
more adversarial role."' Vogler's description, in sum, suggests
a movement in Spain away from the French model, where the
lawyers are largely passive, and toward the new Italian model,
which has adopted at least some of the common law adversarial
nature.
The Canadian approach is somewhat murky. There is no
clear right to the appointment of a lawyer when the accused
cannot afford one, but Kent Roach suggests that section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom "may be violated "if
the accused cannot have a fair trial without legal assistance.1t2
Roach asserts that as "a matter of practice, legal aid is available
to accused who cannot afford a lawyer where there is a likeli-
hood of imprisonment and sometimes where there is a likeli-
hood of loss of livelihood.""' 3 It would seem, then, that Canada
has allowed practice to fill a gap left by a vague doctrine, result-
ing in a breadth of coverage greater than in the United States.
' rd One category is murder. Id. The other two are m)sterious procedural
categories that do not correspond to the American model. See Id.
,s Id. at 122.
'9 Vogler, supra note 55, at 371.
"0 Feldman, supra note 21, at 125.
11 Vogler, supra note 55, at 371.
112 Roach, supra note 45, at 76.
"3 Id. at 75.
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The role of the lawyers in testing the case before the court is the
same as in England and the United States. 
114
Then there are the countries whose formal doctrine pur-
ports to guarantee counsel in all cases but who simply lack the
resources to implement that noble ideal. The Russian Constitu-
tion guarantees the right to have counsel appointed, but New-
combe reports that "securing a lawyer" is "often problematic," in
large part because the state paid fees are so low."" She attrib-
utes to a Moscow City Court judge the view that "attorneys as-
signed to [indigent defendant] cases frequently delay hearings
in these matters in order to attend the proceedings of their well-
paying clients."'16 China is an even more extreme example of
this category. According to Liling Yue, "Constitutional and
criminal procedure law protects the defendant's right to have
counsel. However, due to the Chinese economic situation, it is
impossible to appoint a lawyer for every defendant who is indi-
gent," though judges "may appoint a lawyer if they consider it is
necessary."
According to a news account in the New York Times, the ad-
versarial role of deferrse counsel is not uniformly accepted by
judges and prosecutors in China even when the defendant can
secure a lawyer."8 In the case covered by the Times, Liu Jian, a
young lawyer from a firm in Nanjing, was sent to the small town
of Binhai to represent a defendant charged with taking bribes.
He did what American lawyers (and lawyers at his firm) did
when representing clients: he examined documents, consulted
with his client, interviewed witnesses, and called witnesses to tes-
tify. But when the court convened on July 13, 1998, almost
none of the thirty-seven defense witnesses appeared to testify.
The prosecutor swore and ranted at Mr. Liu, calling him a
criminal. And at trial's end, outside Binhai's courthouse, Mr.
Liu found himself in police custody, charged with "illegally ob-
taining evidence." Mr. Liu spent a nightmarish five months in
detention, subjected at times to beatings and daylong interroga-
tions without food or rest."9 He was not permitted to speak to
.. Id. at 74.
15 Newcombe, supra note 28, at 311-12.
"16 Id. at 312.
"7 Yue, supra note 36, at 88.
"' Elizabeth Rosenthal, In China's Legal Evolution, The Lawiyer's Are Handcuffed,




his wife during the entire time in detention. Though legal ex-
perts from Nanjing and Beijing "rallied to his defense" and de-
clared his innocence, Liu ultimately decided to plead guilty in
exchange for a sentence of time served.
His "crime" of illegally obtaining evidence was to ask lead-
ing questions of the witnesses he questioned prior to trial and to
interview the witnesses alone-the practice in China, it seems, is
for two lawyers to be present during the pre-trial questioning.
But the real "crime" seems to have been his zealous advocacy on
behalf of someone the prosecutor and judge thought guilty.
Professor Li of the University of Politics and Law said, "In cer-
tain cases, when law enforcement bodies don't have a highly de-
veloped legal mentality, they assume lawyers doing their
professional work are doing the bidding of villains."'1 If this ac-
count is representative of how courts function in substantial
parts of China, the role of the right to counsel is quite narrow
in practice and, because of economic conditions, also narrow in
the breadth of coverage.
Beyond the issue of the formal appointment of counsel is
the issue of how to measure when counsel is not performing ef-
fectively. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there seems to be little law in
other countries on the issue of the effective assistance of coun-
sel, unlike in the United States where the issue has been the
subject of thousands of appeals. 2 ' Though this huge body of
case law has generated a lot of heat in the United States, it has
not generated much light. In the first case to define ineffective
assistance, Strickland v. Washington, the Court created a two-
part test for when assistance violates the Sixth Amendment: first,
that the lawyer provided "deficient" representation and, second,
that the deficient representation prejudiced the client's case.
The prejudice test, though difficult to meet, at least can be
stated in a way that gives courts guidance in applying it. The
criminal client must show "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding




. A Westlaw search conducted in April 1997 for the name of the seminal Su-
preme Court opinion on ineffective assistance of counsel produced over 20,000 en-
tries.
1- 466 U.S. 668 (1986).
' Id. at 694.
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As to "deficient" performance, the Court offered a circular
definition: "[T] he defendant must show that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment."'24 Remarkably, the Court offered only the
following as a way out of the circularity it created: the "defen-
dant must show that counsel's representation fell below an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness."2' Undoubtedly sensing the
inadequacy of this definition, the Court defensively instructs the
reader, "More specific guidelines are not appropriate."2
The Court then adopted a presumption that renders guide-
lines largely unnecessary. Concerned about the "distorting ef-
fects of hindsight," the Court concluded, 'Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential.' '127 More to
the point: "a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged ac-
tion 'might be considered sound trial strategy.",128 And the pre-
sumption is, in the Court's words, a "strong" one: "counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable pro-
fessional judgment."'2 In sum, the Court created a procedural
mechanism by which tens of thousands of defendants can chal-
lenge the effectiveness of the lawyer who represented them but,
at the same time, set a standard of review that practically guar-
antees rejection of any claim short of gross incompetence. In
Strickland itself, the Court by a vote of eight to one found the
lawyer's performance at the death sentencing hearing adequate
even though he failed to investigate a plausible claim that the
murders were committed under extreme emotional disturbance
and did not present any evidence at all during the sentencing
hearing.
This issue might not arise in civil law countries. The formal
nature of the trial and (at least until recently) the relatively pas-
121 Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
126 Id.
12 Id. at 689.
'28 Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 690 (1986).
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sive role of defense counsel both before and during trial would
suggest that the question of effective representation might not
even appear on the radar screen of lawyers and judges. The
physical presence of a lawyer representing the defendant might
satisfy the civil law because the right to counsel is not so central
in the first place. Indeed, I found no mention of effective assis-
tance of counsel in the chapters on Argentina, France, Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain. Nor was the issue mentioned in the two
countries with the least-developed legal infrastructure-China
and Russia.
As we will see in the next part, there is another procedural
reason why ineffective assistance of counsel is not very impor-
tant in most countries. The nature of appeal is radically differ-
ent in most other countries. The norm for criminal appeals is
that the appellate courts correct all errors, usually after a re-
hearing, rather than remand for a new trial. The availability of
at least a partial rehearing and a corrective mechanism at the
appellate level, of course, means that "[i]ncompetent represen-
tation in a [lower] court may be remedied by competent repre-
sentation by way of rehearing to the [higher court] .,'1
Even in England, ineffective assistance of counsel is gener-
ally "not in itself a ground of appeal."'3 ' An inquiry into the ef-
fectiveness of counsel is clearly permitted in only two countries
represented in Bradley's book, Canada and Israel. The Cana-
dian approach is very similar to ours. It requires that the legal
advice "be negligent and result in a reasonable probability of a
miscarriage ofjustice."' 2 This seems very close to the Strickland
standard that requires a showing of both "deficient perform-
ance" and "prejudice" to the defendant's case. Roach cites two
cases where the Canadian courts found ineffective assistance.
Both parallel United States Supreme Court cases. One held the
representation of co-defendants was ineffective when they might
be able to place the blame on each other.'33 The other held that
the failure to look for and question witnesses who might sup-
port the defendant's alibi is ineffective assistance of counsel.'4
'" Feldman, supra note 21, at 136-37
' Id at 136.
"' Roach, supra note 45, at 77.
Id. (citing Silvini, [1991] O.A.C. 251); cf. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 335
(1980).
'. Roach, supra note 45, at 77 (citing McKellar [1994] O.AC. 28); cf Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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The Canadian requirement that the defendant show a rea-
sonable probability of a "miscarriage ofjustice" might be harder
to meet than the Court's definition of prejudice to the defen-
dant's case, though both standards are difficult enough to
meet. The Israeli standard is similar to Canada's. It requires
proof not just of prejudice but also requires "evident" proof of a
possible miscarriage of justice-i.e., evident proof of "the risk of
wrongful conviction.'
The only case raising ineffective assistance in South Africa
avoided it by finding waiver. The defendant had "fail[ed] to
take any steps to terminate his counsel's mandate and also ex-
pressed no dissatisfaction with the [lawyer's] conduct of the
case."'36 P. J. Schwikkard and S. E. van der Merwe express the
view, perhaps based on the way the court avoided the issue in
this case, that the right to counsel will include the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel when the right case is presented to the
courts.' 37 Time will tell.
This brief tour of the right to counsel law suggests that the
Court was largely right in Gideon v. Wainwright when it suggested
that defense counsel "may not be deemed fundamental and es-
sential to due process in other countries."'m The more funda-
mental the role for counsel, the less broadly counsel is provided
to indigent defendants who can obtain a fair trial without coun-
sel. The reason counsel is generally more limited in other
countries has nothing to do with a lack of concern with fairness
or accuracy but, rather, manifests the trust that other countries
have (or, perhaps, had) in systems where the prosecutor owed
duties to the defendant, the judge's role was to find the facts as
accurately as possible, and the case can be at least partially re-
heard, and errors of counsel corrected, on appeal.
While this model is different from the modern common law
model, the English approach for centuries was more like the
civil law model. From the eleventh to the nineteenth century in
England, limitations were placed on the right of defendants to
have counsel when defending a felony charge. By the seven-
teenth century, there was an absolute bar on counsel in felony
,5 Harnon & Stein, supra note 58, at 243.
' Schwikkard & van der Merve, supra note 31, at 354 (citing S v. Bennett, 1994
(1) SACR 391 (CC)).
137 Id.
"a 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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cases. Sir Walter Raleigh had to conduct his own defense
against treason while the king was represented by Attorney
General Edward Coke and at least two other counsel."s Writing
a half century later in his Institutes, Sir Edward Coke sought to
justify the no-counsel rule on the ground that serious felony in-
dictments should not be brought, or maintained, unless "the
evidence to convict a prisoner [is] so manifest as it could not be
contradicted." " If a felony charge was brought without mani-
fest evidence, it was the judge's duty to dismiss it, much as the
civil law countries today envision the judge's role. Blackstone
rejected Coke's dictum as both perverse and little short of ri-
diculous,' 4' and by the nineteenth century, Parliament had
changed the rule by statute.'42 After that, English law recog-
nized the necessity of counsel, at least when "desirable . .. in
the interests ofjustice. 143
The civil law countries may be seeing a similar evolution in
the attitude toward counsel. Several of the writers in Bradley's
book commented that the civil law view that defense counsel is
unnecessary has been changing, as part of a general movement
toward a more adversarial model. Italy's 1989 Code of Criminal
Procedure was a "dramatic[] move[] away from its historically
inquisitorial system of criminal justice to a system infused with
adversarial elements.""4 Craig Bradley in his introduction sug-
gests that the civil law countries are becoming more heteroge-
nous, making the notion that prosecutors and judges can
adequately represent defendants of different races or nationali-
ties more difficult to accept today.4 s The full explanation is
likely to be more complicated, including, perhaps, a loss of faith
in the government as ultimate provider of our health and hap-
piness (a view that has long been less prevalent in the United
States than in some of the European countries). After all, the
long flirtation with socialism in Italy, Spain, France, and even to
some extent in England, suggests a belief that the government
will take care of citizens. That flirtation seems, for now, to be
cooling.
'39 2 HOWELL'S STATETRIALS 1 (1603).
3 Coke's INSTUTES * 137.
" 4 W. BiACKSrONE'S COMMENTARIES * 355 (citing 3 Howell's State Trials 726).
'26&7W. 4, c. 114, s. 1 (1836).
' Feldman, supra note 21, at 125.
'"VanCleave, supra note 23, at 245.
'' CRAIG M. BRADLEY, Introduction, in BRADLEY, supra note *. at xxi.
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Of course, the reasons why the civil law countries are creat-
ing a role for lawyers that is closer to the Anglo-American model
are ultimately unknowable, and the ones I offer are based on
pure speculation. What we can conclude with a reasonable de-
gree of certainty is that the models for determining guilt and
innocence are not as far apart as they were in 1963 when the
Court decided Gideon. Though most of that movement has
been the civil systems moving closer to the common law, at least
some movement has been in the other direction. The Court's
decision to permit juries of six " 6 and non-unanimous juries of
twelve,14 7 as well as to permit convictions of petty offenses with
no juries at all," 8 are small steps toward a civil law model that
puts less emphasis on juries. In addition, recent efforts to in-
volve victims in the process move us, however slightly, in the di-
rection of the civil law model.
4 9
Still, it is fair to conclude that the differences between the
civil model and the common law model remain greater in the
context of the right to counsel than in the context of the
authority of police to stop citizens and inquire about their iden-
tity or ask for an explanation of their presence in a particular
place. This suggests that attitudes in the various countries about
the usefulness of police intervention to stop or solve crimes is
more uniform than the attitudes about the best way to deter-
mine the fact of guilt or innocence. I suspect that this is a
common sense observation. People everywhere fear crime and
the political majorities that control the legislatures see police as
useful in protecting against crime. But how best to determine
whether the defendant did X or is guilty of crime Y is more a
function of one's confidence in the accuracy and fairness of the
complete police investigation (not just the original interven-
tion) and of the fairness of prosecutors and judges. The world-
wide view seems to be somewhat non-uniform on these issues.
IV. REVIEW OF VERDICTS AND PROSECUTION APPEAL
Over a biting dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
Supreme Court held in 1904 that the Double Jeopardy Clause
' Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 78-79 (1970).
"7 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
48 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
149 For a defense of a constitutional amendment to protect victims' rights, see
Cassell, supra note 4.
[Vol. 9 1
CRMIMNAL PROCEDURE REVIEW
bars an appeal of a federal acquittal.W In 1937, Justice Benja-
min Cardozo, writing for eight members of the Court in Palho v.
Connecticut,515 held that states were permitted to appeal, in cer-
tain situations, acquittals based on errors of law made by the
judge. The technical distinction between the cases was that in
1937 the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states and
the Palko Court was interpreting the Due Process Clause, which
in the Court's view provided more latitude for prosecution ap-
peals than the Double Jeopardy Clause. When the Court in
1969 held that the Double Jeopardy Clause is part of the Due
Process Clause,'5 2 everyone assumed that prosecution appeals of
acquittals were then forbidden to states as well as the federal
government, though the Court has never squarely held this to
be true. 3
Why should a criminal justice system forbid prosecution ap-
peals? One might assert finality as a value but finality would
suggest forbidding all appeals, not just appeals by the state. As
long as the defendant can appeal but not the prosecution,
which is the system in the United States today, some value other
than finality must be informing the system. That value seems to
be a fear that the government will otherwise be able to wear
down innocent defendants by appealing, retrying, and appeal-
ing until a jury convicts or an exhausted and impoverished de-
fendant accepts a plea bargain. Another value served by the
United States rule is to protect the jury's ability to nullify the
charge and acquit in the face of the evidence. This value is
more controversial than the one seeking to protect factually in-
nocent defendants. But to achieve the latter rationale would
not require an absolute bar on prosecution appeals, as we shall
see.
Consider the strongest case for a prosecution appeal. The
trial judge makes an egregious error-a provably bad reading of
the Fourth Amendment, for example-and grants the defen-
dant's motion to suppress damning evidence of guilt. The state
procedure does not permit interlocutory appeals. The defen-
dant, now sure of victory, spurns the prosecution's plea bargain
'" Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 101 (1904).
. 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
'5 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
' For a more detailed discussion on this point, see GEORGE C. THOMAS III,
DouBLEJEOPARDY, THE HISTORY, TE LAw 256-71 (1998).
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offers, and is acquitted. Would it shake the foundations of jus-
tice to permit the presiding judge to grant the state an appeal of
the decision to suppress the state's evidence? The 1937 Con-
necticut statute considered in Palko authorized that kind of pro-
cess. If the state wins the appeal, there would, to be sure, have
to be a new trial and this offends the notion of finality. But as
finality is always denied the state when the defendant wishes to
appeal, perhaps we might be willing sometimes to deny finality
to defendants if we could protect innocent defendants.
In a case where, through no fault of its own, the state is de-
nied the use of clear evidence of guilt, one could plausibly con-
clude that Holmes and Cardozo are right-that the state should
enjoy a limited right to appeal.5 In Cardozo's words, to permit
the state a partial reciprocal right to appeal for errors of law is
"no seismic innovation. The edifice ofjustice stands, its symme-
try, to many, greater than before."'5 5 Yet the United States Su-
preme Court currently forbids an appeal, at least in federal
cases, even if the judge's ruling was obviously wrong and de-
prived the government of evidence needed for conviction.'
We can test the extent to which Holmes and Cardozo might
be right, and the current Court wrong, by considering how
other countries deal with the issue of prosecution appeals. This
requires an inquiry into how other countries review criminal
verdicts. My own focus on the United States system is demon-
strated by my surprise in learning that most other countries, at
least those surveyed in Bradley's book, use appellate review to
conduct a thorough inquiry into the facts and law underlying
the trial verdict. Having made its own independent inquiry into
the case, the appellate court will either affirm the trial court or
substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, subject to
various kinds of appeals to higher courts that provide the sort of
formal review all our appellate courts provide. Remands for
new trials are rare in most countries, therefore, whether the
original verdict was a conviction or an acquittal. The end of the
appellate process is almost always the end of the case.
This system puts a premium on finality, on getting it right
the first time, rather than sending a case back to be retried if
... This is the conclusion I reach in my book on double jeopardy. See id. at 270-
71.
Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
' Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 55 (1978).
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harmful errors are found. It gives great weight to the value of
finality and also reduces the deleterious effect on the acquitted
defendant. France has a complex version of this model. The
crimes that would be the most serious American felonies are
tried in the Assize courts. 57 Appeals from this court are limited
to issues of law and an acquittal cannot be overtumed'--the
only example of this American rule that I found in Bradley's
book. Other offenses, the majority of all crimes, are treated dif-
ferently. Most offenses that would be American felonies and
many misdemeanors are tried in the Correctional Court.59 "Fi-
nal decisions of the Correctional Court as to guilt, innocence,
dismissal, or sentence may be appealed by the accused, the
prosecuting attorney, the attorney general for that appellate dis-
trict, and certain administrative authorities .... Some of-
fenses that would be misdemeanors in the United States, as well
as public order, regulatory, and traffic offenses, are tried in Po-
lice Court.16' The appeal from Police Court is similar to that
from Correctional Court, though limited to more serious judg-
ments (for example, the suspension of a driver's license or a
fine over a certain amount).
Appeals from both the Correctional and Police Court pro-
duce an "appeal hearing [that] is, in principle, a trial de novo on
all issues of fact, law, or sentencing raised by the appeal."'63 The
decision of the Court of Appeals supplants that of the trial
court, making a retrial unnecessary, though the decision of the
Court of Appeals can itself be appealed to the Court of Cassa-
tion.'M The Court of Appeals has the authority to reverse the
conviction and enter an acquittal, an outcome that on average
has occurred in about twelve percent of the cases appealed.'o
Though Frase does not explicitly mention the right of an appel-
late court to enter a conviction in place of an acquittal, it is im-
1'vFrase, supra note 60, at 144.
'ss Id at 178, 180.
9 d. at 144.
'. Id. at 178.
6 Id. at 144.
... Id. at 178-79
'"Id. at 179.
'"Id. at 179-80.
... Id. at 179.
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plicit in his statement that the prosecution can appeal a final
decision as to innocence."
But, as noted, appeals of the most serious crimes are limited
to convictions. Why the French Code would want to protect ac-
quittals of the most serious felonies, but not other offenses, is
not clear. One could structure a system with precisely the oppo-
site bias-protecting acquittals of less serious crimes and per-
mitting trials de novo in the Court of Appeals for acquittals of
the most serious crimes. The rationales for this hypothetical sys-
tem are efficiency and protecting the public from dangerous
criminals. Trials de novo in the Court of Appeals could, on effi-
ciency grounds, plausibly be limited to cases where the effect of
a mistake is greatest, both for the defendant and the public.
Because the Court of Appeals consists of three judges who re-
view the trial court decision and have the authority to hear wit-
nesses, no reason exists to think that it would render verdicts
that are less accurate than the trial court. Indeed, the availabil-
ity of review de novo in the Court of Appeals for almost all ver-
dicts suggests that the French view its decisions as more likely to
be accurate.
Perhaps the idea behind the French system is that the ac-
cused has so much at stake when charged with a serious felony
that a prosecution appeal de novo in the Court of Appeals is
simply too burdensome. That seems an odd judgment given the
gravity of these crimes. The point for the essay, however, is that
with the exception of the most serious felonies, acquittals in
France can be appealed and heard de novo, and reversed, in the
Court of Appeals.
Germany has a similar, though simpler, model.67 A general
appeal can be initiated by either the prosecutor or defendant by
filing a one-sentence letter. A three-judge panel then holds a
new trial as to guilt as well as sentence. The panel must begin
again and take new evidence. If it upholds the original verdict
and sentence, it dismisses the appeal. Otherwise, the appeals
court substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court. It-
aly's system is similar.'6 In China, both the prosecutor and de-
fendant can appeal. No mention is made of remand and it
appears that the appellate court simply substitutes its judgment
16 id. at 178.
167 Weigend, supra note 51, at 212.
'6 VanCleave, supra note 23, at 280-81.
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for that of the lower court. The law apparently permits the ap-
pellate court to rehear the case or simply to "review the case by
reading the file, interrogating the defendant and interviewing
the defense counsel if the facts of the case are unclear.&9
Israel permits appeals of convictions and acquittals but se-
verely limits the possibility of a new trial. Though Eliahu Har-
non and Alex Stein do not say so explicitly, it seems that the
function of the appellate court is similar to that in France and
Germany: it can substitute its own judgment for the conviction
or the acquittal. A new trial following a conviction is permitted
only in "extraordinary circumstances" and never following an
acquittal.'70 "Unlike an ordinary prosecutorial appeal, [a new
trial following acquittal] would violate the defendant's right
against double jeopardy." 7' The net effect of the Israeli system,
then, seems to be that of the French-German model. The proc-
ess almost always ends with the appellate courtjudgment.
Spain and Russia have systems that are a sort of hybrid be-
tween the French-German model and that in the United States.
In Spain, either party can appeal on the grounds of errors of law
and procedure.' The Supreme Court can either reject the ap-
peal, remand to the trial court with orders to remedy the mis-
take and begin again at the point at which the error was made,
or give a new judgment itself that corrects the error. Spain thus
contemplates retrials of acquittals when the Supreme Court
finds the verdict infected with errors of law, which was the es-
sence of the Connecticut statute reviewed in Palw. Russian
criminal procedure permits appeal in jury trial cases only of le-
gal errors and omissions. Acquittals can be appealed, though
"[s]ome claim" that the "right to appeal acquittals offends the
[Russian Federation] Constitution's prohibition against double
jeopardy."73 The Russian procedure, like the Spanish, gives the
appeals court flexibility to remand for retrial or enter an order
affirming or modifying the original decision (including an out-
right dismissal of the case) .,74
''Yue, supra note 36, at 89.
'_ Harnon & Stein, supra note 58, at 236.
171 [d.
'7 Vogler, supra note 55, at 392-93.
'73Newcombe, supra note 28, at 316.
174 id.
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Canada and Argentina have the model envisioned by Justice
Holmes in his dissent in 1904, and embraced by the Palko Court,
based on the concept of continuing jeopardy.' 5 The common-
sense idea here is that the defendant's jeopardy is not ended
even by acquittal if the verdict is tainted by legal errors. Defen-
dants are protected to a large extent under the Canadian con-
tinuing jeopardy model because the prosecutor cannot appeal
the facts. 76 Similarly, the Argentina chapter notes that appeals
are limited to errors of law and that thousands of cases are re-
versed on appeal "and in favor of all parties to the proceed-
ings.', 7 7 For example, the prosecution can appeal sentences and
the appellate court can enter a more severe sentence. No spe-
cific mention is made of appealing a verdict of acquittal but that
is certainly implied in the "all parties" description of who may
appeal. Unless the trial judge in Canada or Argentina makes an
error of law sufficient to cast doubt on the verdict, an acquittal
thus ends the defendant's jeopardy. But not in every case. Not
when the judge erroneously suppresses some of the state's evi-
dence and thus causes an unjust acquittal. That is Palko.
In England, the less frequent form of appeal is from the
magistrates' court to the High Court.'78 Both convictions and
acquittals can be appealed to the High Court on the ground
that the verdict "was either wrong in law or in excess ofjurisdic-
tion.,,179 David Feldman comments that such appeals are rare;
only 166 occurred in 1996 as compared to 19,000 appeals from
the magistrates' court to the Crown Court.8 The prosecutor is
not permitted to appeal to the Crown Court.'8' That the prose-
cutor rarely resorts to the appeal to the High Court, of course,
does not diminish the point that the prosecutor can appeal any
acquittal on the ground that it was "wrong in law." That option
is not available in the United States.
South Africa's system seems the closest analog to ours,
though remands are more limited. A defendant's successful
appeal of a conviction generally removes the bar to a second
', Roach, supra note 45, at 77; cf Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904)
(HolmesJ, dissenting).
17' Roach, supra note 45, at 77.
" Carrio & Garro, supra note 18, at 50.
" Feldman, supra note 21, at 134.
379 Id.
... Id. at 133, 134.
' Id. at 133.
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trial in the United States.s In South Africa, retrials following
successful appeals of convictions are permitted only when the
trial court lacked jurisdiction, the indictment was invalid, or
there was another technical defect in the procedure.'8 Double
jeopardy principles prevent other retrials. Moreover, the prose-
cution cannot appeal "against an acquittal on the facts."'m No
mention is made of acquittals produced by legal error but if no
retrial is permitted following the defendant's successful appeal
of a conviction, it would be bizarre to permit the prosecutor to
obtain a retrial by appealing an acquittal secured on any
ground.'as A South African defendant who wins an acquittal on
the facts at trial or wins an appeal on any ground is thus for-
ever free of those criminal charges. South Africa's system pro-
vides more finality than ours and is even more strongly tilted
toward the defendant.
Whatever the differences in the mechanism, all the jurisdic-
tions covered in the book, with the exception of the United
States and South Africa, sometimes permit the prosecutor to
appeal an acquittal. Finality is for the most part a two-way street.
Both the prosecutor and defendant can generally appeal, and
the appellate court will affirm or modify the trial judgment, thus
ending the case. This process provides substantially more final-
ity than we have in our system, which almost always requires a
remand for a retrial when an appellate court finds a non-
harmless error infecting a conviction. Innocent defendants are
protected in the United States by forbidding all prosecution ap-
peal. Innocent defendants are protected in other countries by
some combination of a less adversarial prosecutor, who is less
likely to appeal, and the thoroughness of the appellate review.
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 (1964). The only exception is when
the basis for the appellate reversal is insufficiency of evidence, ajudgment that is the
functional equivalent of an acquittal entered by the appellate court. Sme Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
"4Schwikkard & van der Merve, supra note 31, at 356.
"4Id. at 357. This sentence also refers to the prosecution's "right to appeal
against a court's decision on law or a court's decision to release an accused on bail."
Id. Given the antipathy toward retrials, and the lack of mention of appellate courts
modifyingjudgments, the right to appeal on grounds of law seems likely to be lim-
ited to review of sentences or to interlocutory appeals. The next sentence indeed
refers to appealing decisions to exclude evidence from which, presumably, an inter-
locutory appeal would lie.
.. See supra note 176.
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That so many countries permit prosecution appeal in some
contexts does not necessarily mean that Holmes and Cardozo
are right. But it does suggest that we should not lightly disre-
gard the argument made in Palko. A prosecution appeal limited
to mistakes of law made by the trial judge that cost the state evi-
dence of guilt does not shake the edifice of justice. As I noted
earlier, the Court has never ruled directly on this issue since
Palko. Perhaps the experience of other countries provides hope
that if the Supreme Court ever faces this issue squarely, it will
carefully consider the views of Holmes and Cardozo. Perhaps
the Court might even look to other countries for guidance.
More significantly, perhaps our legislatures should consider
some variation of the French-German model for the appellate
process. Though having appellate panels retry, partly or fully,
cases on appeal would involve much more time and energy at
the appellate level, it would save enormous amounts of time
now spent in retrying cases to juries. Moreover, the outcomes
would likely be more accurate than under our present system.
A panel of appellate judges should be better equipped than ju-
ries to separate innocent defendants from those who are guilty.
And this system largely solves the problem of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel that bedevils the United States system. Incom-
petent trial counsel's mistakes can be corrected by counsel at
the appellate level. Presumably, appellate counsel will be more
competent and, in any event, a panel of appellate judges would
compensate for obvious defense counsel error. It is a system
worth considering.
V. CONCLUSION
My brief study of aspects of comparative criminal proce-
dure, drawing from Bradley's book, is more evocative than con-
clusive. My purpose was to help the reader have fun thinking
about different approaches to difficult criminal procedure is-
sues and, in the process, to show that the Bradley book is a use-
ful research tool. I hope I succeeded in both goals.
But this study has drawn some tentative conclusions. The
civil law and common law systems of criminal justice have been
slowly moving toward each other. We are actually quite close
when the issue is the authority of police to detain and question
suspicious individuals. We are somewhat farther apart in the
way we provide counsel to indigent defendants and even farther
apart in the way criminal verdicts are reviewed on appeal. Be-
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cause the appellate systems are so different, we are poles apart
on the issue of whether the prosecutor can appeal an acquittal.
On this issue, we seem to have South Africa as our only ally.
Given the current dissatisfaction with the United States sys-
tem, perhaps Bradley's book will stir suggestions for improve-
ment. I recommend, tentatively, two aspects of the systems
surveyed in this essay--adopting the thorough appellate review
of criminal verdicts and, as a corollary, permitting prosecution
appeal based on errors of law. Others will surely come up with
additional ideas after a study of Bradley's excellent book.
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